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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
A Computer Simulation Model 
for Prediction of Voting in the U.N. 
DOROTHY DODGE* 
This paper discusses an attempt to design a computer 
based simulation model that would be predictive of voting 
behavior of the 127 members of the United Nations. 
The Use of Computer Simulation 
Simulations have been defined by Martin ( 1968) as 
models of system processes or outcomes having the pur-
pose of clarification or explanation of underlying system 
variables and by Hamilton et al (1967) as models rep-
resenting symbolically certain aspects of social, political 
or psychological system processes. A computer simula-
tion represents an attempt to program a theory or system 
model for computer analysis. Social science models fre-
quently are based upon structures involving tentative hy-
potheses or intuitive explication of parameters or varia-
bles, and computer simulation models permit the labored 
analyses often necessary for theory-building and theory-
testing. 
Although simulation models have a variety of pur-
poses, d1eory-building or theory-testing is a frequent us-
age. Harold Guetzkow observes that limited existence of 
theory in the field of social science has " . . . led some 
political scientists to the use of simulation as a theoretical 
tool. It is through simulation that we may examine 
possible relationships among any or all variables that 
we are able to put into the simulation; that is, we 
can use simulation as a theory-building device. Further, 
we can use simulation as a theory-comparing device since 
by changing the variables and relationships among them 
we can generate the consequences of different theories." 
Necessarily, computer simulations should replicate as 
accurately as possible the referent or "real world" system 
or theory to be analyzed. Sydney Verba notes: "The 
process of designing a simulation forces the designer to 
explicate his model of international relations. At times 
this may involve not so much the creation of new per-
spectives on the subject as the explication of traditional 
wisdom. One is forced to make explicit what may have 
been the implicit assumptions about the subject matter-
in order that these assumptions may be placed in the op-
erating model." 
Charles Herman also stresses explication: "In design-
ing a game or simulation, the designer is required to be 
explicit about the nature and relationships between the 
units in the operating model and their counterparts in the 
observable universe. He must specify the conditions 
which cause a relationship to vary." 
Although many analyses of U.N. voting behavior, in 
particular bloc and caucusing group behavior, have been 
undertaken, the explication of voting behavior variables 
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and their relationship to each other is a more difficult 
problem about which little research has been done. The 
first attempt at modeling a U.N. roll call simulation pro-
grammed a group of variables based upon literature on 
the bloc or caucusing group. The testing of the validity of 
the use of these variables and their relationship to each 
other involves comparison with "real world" counterparts. 
Prediction reliability of the model is one method that 
may be employed to compare model operation and out-
comes to the "real world" system. The test of model relia-
bility is the correspondence between model output (pre-
diction of nation-state votes) and the "real world" systems 
( actual roll call votes in the General Assembly). If the 
simulation does not program essential attributes of the 
referent system, the simulation output should not indicate 
with high accuracy the voting behavior of the U.N. system. 
Prediction accuracy, then, will be used as a primary meas-
ure of model validity. 
Model Construction 
In undertaking construction of a prediction model, pre-
vious attempts at simulation rollcall prediction as well as 
literature on U.N. voting behavior were surveyed. No re-
liable U.N. voting prediction model exists, but a number 
of legislative rollcall simulations have shown significant 
predictive reliability. One example is the model by Cleo 
H . Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro for prediction 
of voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. Input 
variables such as party, constituency, and committee were 
used. Cherryholmes and Shapiro grouped "propositions 
concerning the determinants of rollcarI voting behavior" 
into PREDISPOSITION and COMMUNICATION 
phases in order to build a theoretical model that repli-
cated significant aspects of the 'real world' legislative 
processes." (Fig. 1) 
In the PREDISPOSITION PHASE of the model 
"propositions drawn from social-psychological studies of 
attitude formation in general and legislative research in 
particular" were employed as the essential determinants 
of the voting predispositions that "emerge from the cog-
nitions of representatives confronted with legislation." 
Congressional rollcall studies were surveyed to find data 
relating legislative voting behavior to discrete, explana-
tory variables. The variables included in the model were: 
1) party affiliation; 2) constituency type; 3) section or 
region, and 4) individual characteristics. 
The COMMUNICATION PHASE contains proposi-
tions drawn from legislative research concerning the 
"likelihood of communicative interaction between various 
types of legislators," and propositions drawn from re-
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search concerning possible attitude alteration occurring 
from interactions between individuals with different pre-
dispositions. 
The communication phase attempts to program types 
of confrontations that a legislator is likely to face when 
he has not developed a strong predisposition to vote for 
or against a given bill. 
The variables are based upon the frequency of inter-
actions between representatives in positions of leadership 
seeking to inform or exert influence on certain types of 
bills. Each representative is described in terms of his 
party, state, region, constituency characteristics, leader-
ship positions, committee memberships, rank on each 
committee, and seniority. 
U.N .. Model Based on 
Legisl'ative Roll Call Model 
The first attempt at modeling a United Nations voting 
simulation was based upon modification of the Cherry-
holmes and Shapiro legislative model (Figure 2). Modi-
fications included UN data rather than that for the House 
of Representatives. The variables included in the predis-
position and communication phases are described below. 
PREDISPOSITION PHASE: 
Status variables employed for the member of the 
United Nations. 
BLOC - A bloc is described as a group showing 
high voting agreement on all or most issues be-
fore the UN. Only one group, the East European 
Communist, fits this description. Although there 
are other caucusing groups in the UN, their vot-
ing cohesion is limited. Other caucusing groups 
therefore will be considered only in the com-
munications phase. 
COLD WAR POSITION - On some issues East-
W est confrontation has been a significant consid-
eration in the voting behavior of nations . Mem-
bers of NATO, ANZUS and SEATO are coded 
as Western, members of the Warsaw Pact as 
Eastern, and nations belonging to none of these 
alliances as Third World. 
REGION - The geographic location of a nation 
may be a factor in voting behavior on some issues 
that come before the UN. Nations are classified 
according to the following regions: Africa, Asia, 
East Europe, North Atlantic, Latin America, and 
Oceania. 
SOCIO-CULTURAL PATTERN - Certain social 
and cultural factors such as economic develop-
ment, communism, size, religious culture, and the 
intensiveness of agricultural land use, have been 
combined into a classification scheme by Bruce 
Russet. 8 Countries are classified according to the 
following schedule: Afro-Asian, Western Com-
munity, Latin America, Semi-developed Latins, 
Eastern Europe, and unclassifiable. 
COLONIALISM - Colonialism and imperialism 
may have an influence upon voting patterns in the 
UN. For example the African states have opposed 
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voting positions taken by states such as Portugal, 
France and Belgium. For purposes of coding na-
tions that have been ruled by another since World 
War II are considered anti-colonial; nations 
that have held colonies since World War II are 
classed pro-colonial, and nations that have neither 
ruled nor been ruled during that time period, no 
position. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - Many of the 
questions considered by the General Assembly in-
volve aid to developing areas or financing of U.N. 
special programs or peace-keeping. The level of 
economic development of a state may be a factor 
in U.N. voting behavior. Nations are coded as 
high, medium, low, or very low, employing the 
analysis found in the Banks and Textor study, A 
Cross-Polity Survey. 
NATIONAL IDEOLOGY - Nations are likely to 
vote in the same direction on issues of similar 
content. A coding of past voting behavior may 
be helpful in predicting future roll call action. 
Such a past history can be quantified by classify-
ing each resolution and computing the magnitude 
and direction of previous behavior concerning 
similar issues. The Rice Beyle pair agreement 
study 9 of U.N. roll calls for 1960-1965 was used 
to construct the past voting history. 
COMMUNICATIONS PHASE: 
The following are factors that may be significant to 
communication patterns in the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
CAUCUSING GROUP - Within the General As-
sembly there are groups of nations that meet regu-
larly to discuss issues and share information on 
questions before the U.N. These caucusing groups 
serve as one form of communication for the mem-
ber nations. Some nations belong to more than one 
caucusing group. Listed below are the main cau-
cusing groups and their respective sub-groups. 
The Afro-Asian Group 
TheOAU 
The Brazzaville group 
The Casablanca group 
The Asian Group 
The SEA TO cluster 
The non-aligned core 
The Arab Group 
The Latin American Group 
Western Europe and Other States 
Benelux 
The Scandinavian group 
The Communist Bloc 
The Commonwealth 
TRADE PATTERNS -A nation may have a spe-
cial relationship to nations with which it trades ex-
tensively. A pattern of influence may be indicated 
quantitatively by considering the percentage of a 
nation's total trade that involves another state. Total 
trade was determined by adding the value of all the 
imports and exports of each nation for one year. 
Trade amounting to more than five percent of this 
total with any one nation was considered significant 
INFLUENCE - There are many factors that de-
55 
Figure 1. The Two Phases of the Model 
A bill enters the model. 
A representative 
develops a predisposition 
as his attributes are 
matched with those coded 
on the bill. 







The bill confronts the next 
representative. 
~ 1 The representative votes 
on the basis of his 
yes predisposition. 
------ ------
Communication Phase ,, 
The representative The representative votes 
communicates with ~ on the basis of his new 
his colleagues and, predisposition. 
in some cases, the 
President, and develops 
I 
a new predisposition. 
termine influence in the General Assembly; one of 
the most easily quantifiable is the percentage of the 
U.N. budget that a nation is assessed. This factor is 
recorded as the percentage of the total U.N. budget 
for a single year. 
After these revisions in input variables were made for 
the legislative rollcall simulation model, the predisposi-
tion and communication phases were run in an attempt 
to predict United Nations General Assembly rollcall 
votes for the 1965, 1966, and 1967 sessions. Since the 
U.N. has been likened to a parliamentary body in some 
contemporary literature, this adaptation of a legislative 
model permits some opportunity to test the parliamen-
tary theory. On the predisposition phase of the model, 
prediction reliability reached 74 percent for all rollcalls. 
A further adjustment of the legislative model was neces-
sary to allow for abstentions, which are less frequent in 
legislative bodies than in the United Nations. Abstentions 
were predicted if the weights ranged from -.5 to +.5 
rather than the .0 of the legislative model. Analysis of 
predicted and actual rollcall votes for each U.N. member 
revealed that the predisposition phase was more reliable 
in predicting the votes of members from developing and 
non-Western nations and least reliable for developed, 
Western and particularly West European states. The 
model also showed greater error in prediction of East-
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Figure 2 . The Two Phases of the Model (revised) 
A resolution enters the 
model. 
----- - ---------------
Predisposition Ph rase 
' 
A state develops a • predisposition as its I attributes are matched 
with those coded on The resolutio 
the resolution. I 
the next state. 
n confronts 
Is the state's predispo- ~ The state votes on the 
sition strongly positive 
or negative? 




Communication Phase ,, 
The state communicates The state votes on the 
with its leaders, and in 
some cases, other 
leaders, and develops a 
new predisposition. 
~ basis of its new 
predisposition. 
West votes of the West European states and was more 
accurate for North-South issues. 
Rather than following the legislative model pattern of 
a shunt-out of all legislative members receiving a pre--
scribed weighting in the predisposition phase, all U.N. 
members were included in the communication phase of 
the model. Reliability of rollcall prediction dropped to 
55 percent after the communication phase. The results 
suggest either that the variables programmed in the com-
munication phase, i.e., caucusing group membership, 
trade partners and influence weights, are not as signifi-
cant in the U.N. decision-making process as in a legisla-
tive body, or that these variables do not model essential 
factors of the referent system. Rollcall voting appears to 
have been more influenced by nation-state predisposition 
factors than by the communication or caucusing factors 
included in the model. 
These simulation runs suggest that the legislative 
norms programmed by Cherryholmes and Shapiro are 
not highly applicable to the prediction of U.N. decision-
making process. However, the predisposition characteris-
tics of nation-states included in the model suggest some 
relationship to U.N. voting behavior. In order to pursue 
further these predisposition characteristics, it was decided 
to tum to contemporary literature analyzing nation-state 
foreign policy decision-making rather than United Na-
tions voting behavior exclusively. The analysis of this 
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literature may permit a refinement of the predisposition 
factors to be included in the model and possible use of 
previous quantitative research to permit weighting of 
these factors. 
Revised U.N. Model Based 
on Foreign Policy Attributes 
PREDISPOSITION PHASE: The second model attempt 
is based upon the hypothesis that national attributes may 
be related to both United Nations and foreign policy out-
put. An attribute is defined as a characteristic or as a de-
scriptor. Foreign policy studies assume that the attributes 
of one nation are comparable to those of another, and 
that the differences between national attributes are sus-
ceptible of measurement. For example, we might state 
that the GNP of the United States is greater than that of 
Sweden, which is in turn, greater than that of Liberia. 
The number of different attributes that might be in-
cluded in the model is staggering. To group or type them 
is an essential step of clarification or explication for the 
model. In attempting attribute analysis, the Rosenau 
study was considered. In developing his "pre-theory," 
Rosenau argues that "all foreign policy analyses either 
explain the external behavior of societies in terms of 
five sets of variables, or . . . their explanations can be 
recast in terms of the five sets." The five sets, in their 
most recent form are here discussed in relation to na-
tional attributes: 
1. IDIOSYNCRATIC includes the area of personal 
characteristics and perceptions of national leaders, 
which will be excluded from the model since charac-
teristics may change too frequently for time study of 
U.N. voting. 
2. GOVERNMENT AL/POLITICAL SYSTEM varia-
bles contain such attributes as governmental stability 
and degree of democratization. Data for this variable 
is derived from the Banks and Textor study, A Cross-
Polity Survey. 
3. SOCIETAL variables include economic develop-
ment, religious attachment, and educational level. 
The Banks data deck provides economic character-
istics for 124 countries over a ten year period. 
4. EXTERNAL variables cover trade, communica-
tions, and similar elements. The Direction of Trade 
Annual, published by the International Monetary 
Fund as well as the Alger diplomatic flow data deck 
are employed. 
5. SYSTEMIC variables are, for example, geographic 
region or the number of borders. Number of borders 
is excluded since present studies have already shown 
little or no relationship to foreign policy behavior. 
Decision-making literature 
Research concerning identification of predisposition 
attributes and their relationship to foreign policy deci-
sion-making are numerous in the field of quantitative in-
ternational politics. For example Rummel, in a 1963 
study, compared dimensions of conflict behavior with 
and between nations using nine domestic and thirteen 
foreign conflict variables. Seventy-seven nations were 
analyzed covering the years 1955-57. Factor analysis and 
multiple regression results suggested that foreign and do-
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mestic conflict behavior are not generally related to and 
cannot generally be predictors of each other. In a second 
study using data from the same time period for sixty-nine 
nations, some relationship was detected between foreign 
conflict behavior and internal subversion, when demo-
graphic conditions were taken into account. 
Jonathan Wilkenfeld engaged in a "re-evaluation" of 
Rummel's data in an effort to identify any relationships 
which may have been previously obscured. Wilkenfeld 
found positive association between foreign conflict be-
havior and domestic subversion, revolution, and turmoil 
factors for nations in different political groups. 
In 1969 Tanter tested the hypothesis that political 
system attributes increased the relationship between ex-
ternal behavior and attributes which indicate "status 
inconsistency" of nation. He concluded that the regres-
sions are "only moderate and may not yet warrant ac-
cepting them as confirming the ... hypothesis." 
In a 1965 study Arthur Banks and Phillip Gregg as-
sociated political variables such as leadership and con-
sensus with types of foreign conflict behavior in a factor 
analysis of sixty-eight variables for seventy-seven na-
tions. 
Given the negative results from this research, a second 
group of researchers has tested the hypothesis that pat-
terns of foreign policy output can be related to non-
behavioral attributes. Aid or diplomatic representation 
would be classed as non-behavioral interactions. Skrein 
describes them as facts about what nations do and con-
tinuous phenomena rather than as events. Charles A. 
McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard summarize transac-
tions as items of action that have at some point in time 
become so numerous, so commonplace, and so normal 
that they are accounted for in an aggregated form. They 
conclude that interactions are action items of a non-
routine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in 
some clear sense are directed across a national boundary 
and have, in most instances, a specific foreign target. 
Charles McClelland and Robert A. Young in 1969 un-
dertook a factor analysis of four years of WEIS data to 
identify underlying dimensions of behavior. The behavior 
of the sixty most active international actors were reduced 
to three fairly distinct dimensions composed of the 
twenty two types of behavior coded by the WEIS proj-
ect. The McClelland-Young analysis was repeated for 
eighty-six national actors over the forty month period. 
The results yielded the same factors as the McClelland-
Young analysis. The percent of all international behavior 
at the "interaction" level that is associated with either the 
dimensions of Non-Military Conflict or Military Conflict 
was used to construct a conflict score. This measure is 
intended to identify how much of any nation's behavior 
falls into one of the two conflict dimensions. 
PREDISPOSITION PHASE: 
In devising the predisposition phase of the model, the 
selection of attributes based upon foreign policy decision-
making literature was difficult. Attribute numbers are al-
most infinite, and their relation to decision-making is 
tentative or of limited correlation. The Karl Deutsch re-
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search principle of economy and getting "the greatest 
amount of useful information from the smallest body of 
data" was adopted, and the following variables were 
chosen for testing: 
1. Demographic attributes are frequently employed in 
decision-making research. Three demographic vari-
ables are included: population size and population 
growth rate taken from the U.N. Demographic Year-
book. Borders are excluded since research already 
shows little relationship. 
2. A second group of attributes frequently employed are 
economic variables. The Banks data deck including 
GDP, literacy, inhabitants per physician, and con-
sumption of energy for 124 nations are included. 
3. The governmental/societal index attempts to provide 
a scale for what Bruce Russett has termed the com-
plexity and specialization of political institutions or 
Cutright's concept that a politically developed nation 
has more complex and specialized national political 
institutions than a less politically developed nation. 
For purposes of our model, the Banks and Textor 
Cross-Polity Survey is used to provide governmental/ 
societal indicators. 
4. A final set of indicators is transactional, responding 
to non-behavioral attribute research. These measure 
different types of national involvement with other 
countries. The Alger data deck providing diplomatic 
exchange data and a direction of trade deck con-
taining the five highest trade partners for 124 states 
are included in this set of indicators. 
COMMUNICATIONS PHASE: 
A third group of foreign policy literature sees external 
forces as the initiators of behavior and internal factors as 
mediators of these factors. One general concept desig-
nated as a significant mediator between the external en-
vironment and the actions of a national actor is "image." 
For example, Festinger hypothesizes that the effective-
ness of communication depends on: 
Whether the recipient attends to it; 
Whether be learns its contents, and; 
Whether be accepts the contents. 
"Attentiveness" also is identified as a relevant vari-
able by a number of authors in the field of political be-
havior and international relations. Attenttiveness is 
treated either as an intervening variable between im-
pinging forces and action or as a useful indicator even 
though its sources are ignored. 
Bruce M. Russett's work on Anglo-American rela-
tions indicates that there is a direct relationship between 
what might be called the positive attentiveness of one 
country to the other and the positive actions of one coun-
try toward the other (and therefore, perhaps its voting 
agreement) . 
Karl Deutsch as a result of a 1956 study concluded 
that the aspect of politics that is constituted by com-
munication includes " . .. the areas of attention, of per-
ception, and orientation, of values and evaluation, of 
goal-seeking and of decision-making." 
T . M. Newcomb suggests that an actor's "readiness to 
respond" to given external situations and events depends 
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to some extent on the actor's "attraction" toward the ob-
jects and subjects of communication. 
Hypotheses from these studies suggest that the amount 
of trade flowing between two nations may be directly re-
lated to the amount of attention they devote to each 
other; and that the amount of high-level government 
action directed by one nation to another is directly re-
lated to the amount of attention devoted. 
The Skrein study of United Kingdom transactions sug-
gests that how much action a nation engages in at the 
"interaction" level, how much trade flows between the 
United Kingdom and a nation, and how much action at 
the interaction revel is targeted by a nation to the United 
Kingdom account for 71 percent of the variance in 
United Kingdom attention across eighty-six nations. 
The variables used in the communication phase will 
attempt to employ the results from the "attention" and 
"image" studies. The variables included are: 
Direction of trade data 
U.N. caucusing group membership 
The Alger diplomatic trade data deck 
WEIS transaction data 
The use of these attributes from previous foreign 
policy decision-making studies in constructing the simu-
lation model will permit some testing of whether these 
attributes are applicable to U.N. decision-making be-
havior; and which, if any, of these attributes serve as 
better predictors for U.N. voting behavior. 
The attributes included in the predisposition and com-
munication phases will be correlated to previous voting 
coalition analysis. Two hundred and twenty General As-
sembly rollcall votes were analyzed for the period 1960-
1965 for the 114 member nations of that period, using 
the Rice-Beyle method. This method analyzes a sample 
of rollcall votes by plotting the pair agreement of all 
members of the body to be studied. Indices of agreement 
which exceed a certain arbitrary percentage selected as a 
standard for voting cohesion are noted and patterns of 
voting agreement indicated. Rice and Beyle differed 
somewhat on their agreement indices. Beyle indicated 
maximum cohesion at 100.00 and used an index of 0.0 
to 100.00 to represent the degree to which unity was 
approached. Rice employed a percentage of agreement 
index. Cohesion was indicated by the percentage of roll 
call votes on which two members voted alike. In the 
Dodge study, an arbitrary index of cohesion was placed 
at 66.66 and above. Using these Rice-Beyle cohesion 
percentages for the 1960-1965 period, each attribute 
listed in the predisposition and communication phases 
will be analyzed for possible relationship to high or low 
voting cohesion in the U.N. 
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APPENDIX A 
Predisposition and Communication Code Book 
Original Model for Rollcall Prediction 
I.B.M. 
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Code Numbers-explanation 
0-126 Found in alphabetical 
listing of the nations. 
skip 
01 South America 
02 Central America 
03 North America 
04 West Europe 
05 East Europe 
06 Oceanic 
07 Mideast 




card column Variable 
8 socio-cultural region 
9 Cold War Position 
IO Colonialism 
11 Economic Development 
Status 
12-13 ideological factor #J 
( peaceful settlement) 
14-15 ideological factor #2 
(self-determination) 
16-17 ideological factor #3 
( collective measures) 
18-19 ideological factor #4 
(social human) 
20-31 skip 
32-33 caucus group I 
34-35 caucus group 2 
36-37 caucus group 3 
38-39 caucus group 4 
40-42 greatest trading partner 
Code Numhcrs- explanation 
09 Orient;il 
10 North Africa 
11 Central and South Africa 
I Afro-Asia 
2 Western Community 
3 Latin America 
4 Semi-Developed Latins 




3 Third World 
0 Unclassified 
1 Colonial Power 





4 Very Low 








03 Brazzaville Conference 
04 Casablanca Conference 
05 Asian Group 
06 SEATO Cluster 
07 Non-aligned care 
08 Arab Group 
09 Latin American 
10 Western European 
and Other States 
11 Benelux 
12 Scandinavian Group 
13 Communist Bloc 
14 Commonwealth 
111-126 (partner's ID number) 
43-47 % trade with greatest .0000-XX.XX 
partner 
48-50 2nd greatest 
trading partner 
51-55 % of trade with 
2nd partner 
56-58 3rd greatest 
trading partner 
59-63 % of trade with 
3rd partner 
64-66 4th greatest 
trading partner 
67-71 % with 4th 
trading partner 
72-76 Per Cent of 
U.N. Budget 











(four numbers and decimal point) 
e.g .. 0016 
6.432 
21 .87 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
